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Exploring the Influence of Political Connections and Managerial 
Overconfidence on R&D Intensity in an Emerging Market Context: the Case 
of China’s Large-scale Private Sector Firms 
 
 
Abstract: Political ties and managerial cognitive biases, specifically overconfidence, have been 
identified as affecting firm-level R&D processes and outcomes. Here we further conceptually and 
empirically explore how these two factors may influence R&D intensity in an emerging market 
context. Our empirical results, based on panel data from 1,293 Chinese publicly listed firms 
(between 2010-2014) show, contrary to some previous research, that stronger formal political ties 
somewhat reduce firm-level R&D intensity. Greater overconfidence in managers, by contrast, 
increases R&D intensity. Interestingly, moreover, overconfidence positively moderates the 
relationship between political ties and R&D intensity to the extent that the negative relationship 
becomes positive in the presence of overconfidence. We discuss possible reasons for these results, 
which highlight the role of managerial mind-set as an important determinant of R&D intensity in 
an emerging market context.  
 
Keywords Political connections, Cognitive bias, Overconfidence, R&D intensity, Private 
enterprise. 
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1 Introduction 
Extant research has identified political ties and managerial overconfidence as important 
factors shaping innovation processes in developed market firms. But how important are they in 
emerging market contexts? Strong political ties can create the reassurances and certainty required 
to undertake large-scale, risky exploratory innovation projects in developed markets. In emerging 
markets contexts, however, standard reasoning suggests political ties may potentially be of even 
greater importance. This is because emerging markets typically possess far weaker institutional 
environments and thus a highly complex nexus of government to business inter-relationships 
often develops to substitute for formal institutions. These relationships, pervasive as they are, 
may potentially influence managerial and firm behaviours in important ways, including those 
related to firm R&D investments. To date, however, comparatively little research has looked at 
the influence of political connections on firm R&D intensity in emerging market contexts. The 
findings, moreover, are somewhat mixed (Cumming and Rui, 2015; Gu and Lundvall, 2006; Lin 
et al. 2011; Song et al., 2015; Wu, 2011; Zhang et al., 2014).  
The impact of the psychological traits of key executives has also received considerable 
attention in the developed market context (Hirshleifer, et al. 2012), though far less interest for 
emerging market contexts (Li and Tang, 2010; Tang et al. 2015). Managerial cognitive biases, 
specifically managerial overconfidence (sometimes also referred to as managerial hubris), has 
consistently been identified  as an important positive determinant of firm innovation intensity, 
output and efficiency in developed markets (where the focus has been upon patenting outputs and 
risk taking behaviour) (Hirshleifer et al, 2012; Tang et al., 2015). It has been argued that owing to 
the significant risks involved in much innovation, ignorance of the true magnitude of these risks 
may actually make overconfident managers more suitable for firms looking to innovate (Galasso 
and Simcoe, 2011). This character trait, of course, could also be especially important in the more 
uncertain, difficult and risky context of an emerging market. Again, weak domestic institutions 
and imperfect markets intensify the potential hurdles and challenges to innovation. We thus also 
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look to consider the impacts of bounded rationality in an emerging market context (that of 
China’s large-scale private sector). We do so via the use of the now established construct of 
managerial overconfidence (Bondt and Thaler, 1994; Herz et al. 2014).  
Finally, we additionally consider ways in which managerial overconfidence and political ties 
may interact to influence innovation. In particular, we consider the conditions under which 
political connections may affect R&D intensity. We argue that cognitive biases may actually play 
an important role in positively moderating the impact of political connections on R&D intensity. 
This is because overconfident managers, as well as doing more innovation, also pursue 
qualitatively different types of innovation project. These are typically more exploratory, as 
opposed to exploitative projects and thus may more readily benefit more from stronger political 
ties. Furthermore, overconfident managers may be more adept at fully exploiting political ties.  
As well as contributing to the conceptual debate regarding the role of political ties and 
managerial overconfidence on innovation, our findings also shed potentially important light on 
the development of the Chinese economy. The emerging market context we consider here is that 
of China’s  large-scale private sector.  After more than 30 years of rapid development China’s 
private sector has become a major driving force behind economic growth. In 2012 Chinese 
private firms accounted for approximately 80% of registered enterprises, 65% of GDP, 30% of 
China’s exports, 60% of investment and 80% of Chinese employment (Li et al., 2012). China’s 
private sector, however, is still predominantly oriented towards labour intensive low value added 
products. Sometimes these are referred to as the “three low products” because they are typically 
oriented towards products: based upon low-level technologies; typified by labour intensive 
products earning low value-added; commanding correspondingly low prices. As China’s 
demographic dividend has tapered off, however, and labour costs have risen, the private sector 
has recently encountered severe growth challenges. These have been exacerbated by currency 
appreciation. With the exception of some very successful private businesses that have managed to 
develop their own core, proprietary technologies, reputations and brands (e.g. Huawei, Sany 
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Group, BYD, DJI Group and the like), many private sector firms have struggled in the wake of 
the global financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn.  
This trend has become of considerable concern to Chinese policy-makers. Recent research 
now recognises the fundamental role that the private sector will play in driving forward 
innovation and, in turn, pushing China through the middle income trap (Lin et al. 2011; Zhu et al. 
2012; Deng et al. 2013; World Bank, 2013). A co-authored report published by the Development 
Research Centre of the State Council and the World Bank (2013), for example, argues that if 
China wishes to move from middle to high income status, increased productivity growth is 
required. This, it argues, can only be achieved by further development of innovation capabilities 
in the private sector. China’s innovation policy, it argues, should “reflect the lesson borne from 
international experience that most applied research and innovation is done within large private 
sector firms” (World Bank, 2013: 36)(emphasis added). To achieve this target, both extensive 
(more private firms) and intensive (deepening of R&D intensity) private sector development is 
required. Promoting private sector R&D investment intensity is also necessary if it is to compete 
on an equal footing with international peers. The average R&D intensity of China’s top 500 
private firms is generally considered to be comparatively low (Lin et al. 2011). It stood at only 
1.73% in 2013, for example, compared to 2.3% in the UK’s top private firms (UK DTI, 2012). 
Increasing R&D intensity may help these private sector firms progress from more basic 
exploitative innovation strategies to more advanced, exploratory types of innovation (Nunes et al., 
2012; Saha, 2014). This is vitally required as China approaches the international technology 
frontier. At this point remaining supplies of easily imitable available technologies on the 
international technology market are reduced, leading to a drop-off in productivity growth.   
We make three main contributions. First, using a large-scale panel data set we cast further 
light on the relationship between managerial political connections and R&D intensity in the 
context of an emerging market (i.e. China’s private sector companies). Extant literature has 
argued that political connections facilitate access to investment capital and substitute for the weak 
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private property rights found in underdeveloped institutional environments and can therefore be 
beneficial for innovation (Cummings and Rui, 2015; Lin et al. 2011). Interestingly, however, we 
find evidence to the contrary, suggesting political ties in isolation may retard R&D intensity, 
potentially impeding longer-term performance. Secondly, while managerial hubris is often 
associated with negative outcomes for firms, we advance further evidence for the positive 
impacts of such hubris with regards to firm innovation intensity. There may be especially good 
reasons for thinking such biases play an important role in the more unpredictable and challenging 
market environments of developing economies and those undergoing transition, like China.  
Thirdly, we identify managerial overconfidence as an important moderator of the relationship 
between political ties and R&D intensity. We thus identify managerial cognitive biases as a key 
driver of innovation intensity in China’s private sector, suggesting that the mind-set of senior 
managers may affect innovation strategy in quite important ways in the emerging market context.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the research 
hypotheses; Section 3 presents the research design; Section 4 describes the sample and data, 
reports the empirical results, and discusses the findings; Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Conceptual background and hypotheses 
Given conflicting evidence and arguments, we first outline two competing hypotheses regarding 
the possible impacts of political ties on innovation intensity in China. Second, we develop a 
hypothesis regarding the potentially positive impacts of overconfidence. Thirdly, we consider the 
possible moderating influences of overconfidence on the impact of political ties on innovation 
intensity. Specifically, we argue that overconfidence is associated with particular types of 
innovative activities, ones that more readily benefit from having such ties. Further, overconfident 
managers are better placed to exploit the potential of such ties. 
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2.1 The impacts of managerial political connections on firm R&D intensity 
There are comparatively few studies looking at the impact of political ties on innovation in 
China, either in terms of innovation outcomes (like patenting) or inputs (such as R&D intensity) 
(Cumming and Rui, 2015; Lin et al. 2011; Song et al. 2015; Wu, 2011; Zhang et al., 2014).  
There are, however, a number of studies on the impacts of political ties on firm performance (i.e. 
financial performance, share price and so on) (Faccio, 2006). Their findings, however, are rather 
mixed. Some find that political ties enhance financial performance (Guo, Xu, and Jacobs, 2014; 
Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou, 2008; Sheng, Zhou, and Li, 2011; Zhou, 2009). Such ties, it is argued, 
may do so by providing a number of benefits, including:  better financial resources (i.e. via state 
banks)(Li et al., 2008; Zhou, 2009); intellectual property rights protection in a weak legal 
institutional environment (Cumming and Rui, 2015); access to reliable, higher quality 
information (Song et al., 2015); and other supportive policies (i.e. favourable regulations, reduced 
tax rates and the like). Other studies, by contrast, argue (and empirically verify) that political ties 
may actually drag firms away from market oriented goals and lead them into a variety of 
unproductive activities (Fan et al., 2007). Political affiliations, in particular, may “ossify 
organisational routines” (Jie, 2011: 1151) and lead to involvement in projects that support local 
political objectives (i.e. fostering employment, short term profit maximisation to sure up local 
government budget deficits and the like), as opposed to firm profitability (Fan et al., 2007). This 
school of thought, therefore, shows by contrast that there are negative impacts on performance 
(Fan et al., 2007).  
Turning to the limited research that talks more directly to the links between political ties and 
firm-level innovation in China, one is again left with equivocal findings and competing 
arguments (Cumming and Rui, 2015; Song et al., 2015; Wu, 2011; Zhang et al., 2014).  
Cummings and Rui (2015), for example, have recently argued that political ties increase access to 
direct governmental financing for private sector firms. They find there is also a relationship 
between financing and innovation investment and show that the costs of political instability on 
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innovation are less severe for politically connected firms (Cummings and Rui, 2015). This 
suggests some political ties may have a positive impact on investment innovation intensity.  Wu 
(2011) similarly argues that government control of available innovation resources has 
significantly impacted the R&D investment of Chinese firms. It has done so by appropriating 
R&D venture capital and investment funds and the transfer of scientific talent to businesses. 
Consequently, it is argued, close political connections can facilitate access to external innovation 
resources for Chinese businesses, which in turn improves their R&D intensity. Furthermore, 
political connections may act as an informal yet effective substitute for formal property rights 
protection, thereby protecting the infringement of the intellectual property of private firms (Cai et 
al., 2014; Shi and Gu, 2013; Jiang, 2012). This in turn can help create incentives for private 
sector R&D activities and lead to greater R&D intensity. Thus, it has been argued R&D intensity 
may be strengthened via the development of political ties. Empirically, moreover, Lin et al. (2011) 
have found that firms with political ties had greater R&D intensity than those without links (using 
a World Bank survey of 1088 private manufacturing firms in the 2000 to 2002 period). This leads 
to our first hypothesis.   
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Stronger political ties lead to increased R&D intensity in China’s private sector 
firms. 
 
In contrast to these positive arguments, however, Zhang et al. (2015), using a World Bank survey 
of 1,500 Chinese manufacturing firms, draw far more negative conclusions about the impact of 
political ties on innovation. They firstly consider the specific conditions under which investments 
in nurturing political ties may improve performance, as well as when they do not.  They argue 
(and demonstrate) that the returns to investing managerial time in cultivating political ties in 
China depend heavily upon the particular type of technological innovation being pursued. They 
identify two categories of innovation. Exploratory innovation involves novel technological and 
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market knowledge that departs from the firm’s existing knowledge-base and is inherently risky 
(March, 1991). Exploitative innovation, however, looks to develop existing technological 
knowledge and buttresses existing technological skills and processes. Exploitative innovation, 
they argue, in turn involves much lower technological and external market uncertainty. By 
contrast, with innovation that is more exploratory, considerably higher levels of institutional 
uncertainty exist. This is because gaining explicit or tacit permission for radically new products 
or processes requires far more extensive and higher levels of regulatory approval, which often 
also involves “wide, discretionary interpretations by local government officials” (Zhang et al. 
2015: 370). Stronger political ties may facilitate and lower the costs of such approvals, in these 
cases, and decrease the uncertainty involved in enforcing such things as intellectual property 
rights. This in turn bolsters R&D intensity. For exploitative innovations, by contrast, existing 
regulatory approvals may already suffice. Furthermore, as incremental improvements to existing 
products or processes may be harder to protect (even with the support of political ties), investing 
in political ties may not make much sense in the case of innovation that is more exploitative in 
nature.  Zhang et al. (2015), therefore, show that in cases where exploratory types of innovation 
take place, stronger political ties do improve firm innovation performance but for exploitative 
innovation they do not. Extending this line of reasoning we might also infer a positive 
relationship for R&D intensity as well as innovation outputs (Zhang et al. (2015) focus upon 
outputs).   
Jie (2011) and Song et al (2015) similarly argue the general impacts of political ties on 
innovation are negative. Jie (2015), for example, using survey responses from 300 firms in five 
major Chinese cities argues that while political ties may bring some of the aforementioned 
benefits (access to resources, information, property rights protection, increased product 
legitimacy) they do so at a cost. These costs, moreover, quickly outweigh the benefits. They 
mainly involve adoption of negative “internal routines” (Jie, 2011: 1153). Specifically, this 
involves reduction in managerial incentives to innovate as managers look to political patronage to 
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improve firm performance, actively engage in rent-seeking and become distracted by political 
targets (as opposed to those driven by the market).  Similarly, Song et al. (2015) look at 269 
listed private firms between 2003 and 2008 and show that political ties come at the cost of 
reducing innovation efficiency, as firms are forced to bow to “government pressure exerted by 
those political relations” (Song et al. 2015: 298). This involves additional engagement in 
non-productive activities, so limiting the amount that can be allocated to innovation.  Lin et al. 
(2014) also argue that political ties simply distract managers and take up managerial attention. 
Owing to the expectations of risk-averse government officials for short-term performance targets, 
moreover, managers with political ties may invest resources in low-risk projects with short-term 
pay-offs (rather than longer-term and higher risk R&D projects, decreasing R&D intensity). 
Political connections, furthermore, also may lead to the softening of budget constraints and 
reduction in market competition, diminishing the firm’s motivation to develop core technological 
capabilities via innovation (Lin et al., 2014). Lin et al. (2011) also speculate that in general 
former government officials may simply not be very interested or good at innovation. Thus, there 
are also good reasons for supposing political ties may reduce R&D intensity in Chinese firms, 
standing in direct contrast to hypothesis 1a.  
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Stronger political ties lead to a reduction in R&D intensity in China’s private 
sector firms. 
 
2.2 Managerial overconfidence and private sector R&D investment intensity 
 
Studies of innovation and cognitive biases in China have drawn from upper echelons theory 
(Li and Tang, 2010; Tang, et al., 2015). This argues that the psychological traits of managers 
affect firm decisions and in turn outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), including investment 
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decisions.  One such trait that has received increasing attention is that of managerial 
overconfidence, which it has been found, “matters for corporate investment decisions” 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2015: 39).  Managerial overconfidence (and the similar concepts of 
managerial hubris, optimism, or narcissism, all of which can capture “executive core 
self-evaluation”) is characterised by extreme self-confidence and managerial personal 
self-assessments which are excessively optimistic (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). This leads to “a 
hyper-level” of executive self- appraisal and results in an exaggerated belief personal judgment 
deviating from objective standards (Tang, et al. 2015: 1701; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). In 
general, when an individual’s confidence in the accuracy of their own predictions exceeds the 
actual accuracy of those predictions, this individual can be considered overconfident.   
Overconfidence has often been thought of as damaging for firms. It may, for example, 
negatively influence firm acquisition premiums (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), corporate 
financial policies (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), and managerial risk taking (Li and Tang, 2010).  
Interestingly, when it comes to innovation, however, the opposite has been suggested. It may be 
beneficial for key executives to be overconfident, owing to the high risks involved in innovating. 
Managers with inflated views of their own capabilities are more likely to take the greater risks 
necessary for successful innovation.  Indeed, a positive relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and innovation has been found in developed markets, like the US (Galasso and 
Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012).  Robust support, moreover, has also been 
identified in more unstable and difficult market environments, like China (Li and Tang, 2010; 
Tang et al., 2015).    
Tang et al. (2015), in their comparative study of innovation and overconfidence in China and 
the US, have suggested a number of reasons why managerial overconfidence leads to higher 
levels of innovation. First, overconfident managers overestimate their problem-solving abilities 
and hence overestimate expected returns from innovation. Such managers, it is argued, may 
overestimate their own ability, performance and control of a situation and chances of succeeding 
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(Tang et al. 2015). Such hubris causes executives to take greater risks, which may involve 
selecting projects that most non-hubristic managers would believe to have only small chances of 
success. These types of innovative projects are necessarily difficult and risky. They may involve 
the use of entirely new business methods or technologies, or exploration of new markets and their 
outcomes are hard to predict. Executives who expect a higher chance of success and a lower 
chance of failure are thus more inclined to pursue high risk exploratory innovation projects 
(Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Hirschleifer et al. 2012).  
Second, hubristic decision makers are affected by the “difficulty effect”. This means they 
think themselves better at undertaking relatively challenging tasks than simpler ones (Tang et al. 
2015). As the success of innovation projects, moreover, may also be perceived by others as an 
indication of strong managerial vision or ability, overconfident managers see the exploitation of 
“talent- and vision-sensitive projects” as a way of promoting their own self-image. In turn this 
enhances their value job market value (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011). Indeed, overconfident 
managers generally achieve greater total patents and patent citations than non-overconfident 
managers in innovation intensive industries. It was found, for example, the former received on 
average 79 patents compared to 20 in the latter (and three times as many patent citations) 
(Hirshleifer et al. 2012:1458). Pursuing innovative projects, it is therefore concluded, is “likely to 
be consonant with the self-image of an executive who is strongly ego driven or self-aggrandizing” 
(Tang et al. 2015: 1701). 
 Third, overconfident managers exhibit a strong “internal locus of control”. Such 
individuals are convinced that the outcomes of their behaviors are the result of their own efforts 
(Rotter, 1966). They believe their decision making is less determined by factors beyond their 
control and more by those within it. They are more convinced of their own abilities to influence 
their environments compared with those exhibiting an external locus of control. In the latter case, 
such managers tend to be more passive, believing events are beyond their control. Executives 
with an internal locus of control are thus more inclined to towards entrepreneurial activities (Tang 
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et al.: 2015).  
Empirical research has shown that overconfident executives invest more heavily in R&D 
and achieve greater innovation outputs (by patent and citation counts) (Hirshleifer et al. 2012).  
While this relationship has been verified in developed markets (i.e. the US) it has also been found 
in more volatile, high-risk environments. In these market environments, which typically have 
weak intellectual property rights, innovation may be even more challenging and thus 
overconfidence may be of particular relevance (Tang and Li, 2010: Tang et al. 2015). Given the 
difficult market environment found in China (faced by imperfect markets and institutional voids), 
one might predict overconfidence to be especially important to innovation in China’s private 
sector, which itself faces additional challenges to that of the state sector.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Managerial overconfidence promotes greater R&D intensity in China’s private 
sector firms. 
 
2.3 Managerial overconfidence as a positive moderator of the impact of political connections on 
private firm R&D intensity 
 
Do any particular factors moderate the relationship between political ties and R&D intensity, 
amplifying or weakening the link between the two? One possible consideration is that managerial 
overconfidence itself may positively moderate this relationship. There are several reasons for 
entertaining this possibility.   
Firstly, overconfident managers are not only more likely to do more innovation but are 
considerably more likely to pursue radical projects that are exploratory, rather than exploitative, 
in nature (i.e. involving more of the “R” than “D” in R&D) (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; 
Hirshleifer et al., 2012).  This is important, as Chinese firms have a history of engaging in fairly 
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conservative imitative types of innovation strategies.  For example, Alcorta et al. (2009) 
undertook a survey of over 300 manufacturing firms. They found most were: “trying tested and 
proven outside technologies that work” and avoiding “experimenting as much as possible” 
(quoted in Gu et al. 2009: 380). Those that engaged in what were considered more “ambitious 
knowledge efforts”, moreover, still had a tendency to build upon “existing industry sources and 
available equipment” (Gu et al. 2009: 380). Al Corta et al. (2009) have referred to this approach 
as “minimalist” and an “embodied knowledge” strategy (quoted in Gu et al. 2009: 380). Gu et al. 
(2009) conclude that the findings of the Al Corta survey may be generalizable to China as a 
whole. They note, for example,  that: “a general picture of organizational learning at firm level 
in China is not encouraging thus far. … by and large, firms in China are weak in innovation” (Gu 
et al. 2009: 380).  This is in part because of the qualitative nature of the conservative innovation 
that Chinese firms pursue, characterised as exploitative in nature (i.e. using “minimalist” or 
“embodied knowledge” strategies).  Breaking away from these more conservative strategies may 
require a different kind of mind-set, one which overconfident managers may be better equipped 
to follow. Indeed, it is likely the qualitative nature of innovation that overconfident managers 
pursue is different to that pursued by non-cognitively biased managers (Galasso and Simcoe, 
2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Interestingly, Zhang et al. (2015) have shown that for these types 
of exploratory innovation strong political ties are of much greater importance in the Chinese 
context (i.e. vis a vis exploitative types of innovation which do not benefit so much from political 
ties).  
Explorative innovation benefits from political ties primarily because such ties lower the 
uncertainty associated with negotiating China’s weak institutional environment.  In cases of 
exploratory types of innovation, Zhang et al. (2015) argue, there are far higher degrees of 
uncertainty in negotiating China’s complicated and fickle institutional environment (involving for 
example approvals of complex patents). Political ties, therefore, may add considerable value in 
these cases. Exploitative types of “minimalist” innovation (directed towards marginal 
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improvements in existing technologies, practices and so on), by contrast, are subject to far fewer 
approvals. In general, the uncertainty involved is far less. In such cases, therefore, political ties 
are likely to be less beneficial. They may possibly even prove a distraction to managerial 
attention, so leading to lower R&D intensity. Overconfidence, via its increased focus on 
exploratory innovation may, therefore, positively moderate the relationship between political 
connections on R&D intensity. Instead of political connections being superfluous to R&D 
intensity, in such cases they become beneficial and important to it. They allow private firms to 
fully extract the rents accruable from innovation, which in turn creates the incentives and 
motivation to intensify R&D investments.  
Secondly, having excessively high degrees of managerial overconfidence may itself also be 
an important precondition necessary to fully benefit from governmental ties. It cannot be taken 
for granted that political connections can be equally exploited by all types of managers in the 
same way. Indeed, firms and their managers vary greatly in their abilities to conform to and 
manipulate the institutional environment during the innovation process (Oliver, 1991). To exploit 
political ties, managers may need to be persistently assertive and direct with government 
bureaucrats, a character trait associated with overconfidence.  If pre-emptive enforcement of 
certain intellectual property rights is required, for example, hubristic managers may be more 
active in using their existing political ties. Being overconfident, they will place a higher valuation 
on their intellectual property and thus be more proactive in protecting it. Similarly, they may be 
more forceful in extracting financing from political connections, believing their projects to be of 
greater value than non-overconfident managers and thus worthy of additional financing.  
Thirdly, it may be equally important that political actors develop their own belief in the 
managers that they support if such political ties are to be ultimately productive. Overconfident 
managers may better market and sell themselves as firm custodians. More importantly, they may 
be better at conveying and convincing political representatives of the excellent growth prospects 
of their firms. Thus they may present a stronger image of themselves as managing firms with the 
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potential for very rapid growth. Such managers will be more likely to market their firms as ones 
with potential to strongly contribute towards the strategic political objectives of their politically 
affiliated partners (.i.e. with rapid sales and tax revenue growth, local employment creation and 
the like). Such high growth firms may also offer the greater potential for private kick-backs and 
insider benefits for government officials. Thus overconfident managers may potentially be able to 
gain more from political ties as, in the perceptions of government bureaucrats and politically 
connected elite, they appear more attractive as partners to support. Overconfident managers may 
capture more of the latent value associated with any given political tie.  
There are, therefore, several reasons why managerial overconfidence may positively 
moderate the relationship between political ties and R&D intensity. In essence, for any given 
political connection, overconfident managers can extract greater benefit from it. This means that 
instead of political ties becoming a potential drag on innovation and innovation intensity, they 
become a benefit to it.  As they typically may engage in qualitatively different types of 
innovation (i.e. explorative, as opposed to exploitative) the returns to political ties increase which 
in turn strengthens the inclination of managerial attention towards greater R&D intensity.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Managerial overconfidence positively moderates the impact of political ties on 
R&D intensity in China’s private sector firms.  
 
 
Figure 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
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Our sample comes from privately controlled Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges covering the period 2010 to 2014. We use lagged financial data and 
exclude: financial companies and companies which included financial operating units; companies 
in the process of transference or other special treatment; those with incomplete data or 
information disclosure; outlier companies, with R&D intensity and degree of overconfidence 
winsorized at the 1 and 99% quantiles. The final sample consisted of 1,293 firms. 
 
R&D investment data for the sample firms comes from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research database (CSMAR). Further data was also collected from the information 
disclosure website, Huge Tide Network (www.cninfo.com.cn), designated by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. Data on political connections was manually extracted from personal 
data on executives provided by CSMAR. The data on overconfidence in managers and the control 
variables (including corporate governance, company scale, age, and financial performance, see 
Table 1), were drawn from the China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) Xenophon database. 
R&D industry level investment data were extracted from the China Statistical Yearbook on 
Science and Technology (2011 to 2015). 
 
3.2 Variables and measurements 
 
R&D intensity. We use R&D expenditure to operating income to measure R&D intensity 
(Chen and Miller, 2007; Gentry and Shen, 2013). Additionally，we use the ratio of firm R&D 
intensity scaled to the national average (using national industrial R&D expenditure) as an 
alternative dependent variable. 
Political connections. Political connections exist both formally and informally, the latter 
involving tacit relationships between the enterprise and government officials. They thus manifest 
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themselves in numerous ways. Faccio’s (2010) formal proxy, for example, establishes whether a 
manager is a government official or a member of parliament. Li et al. (2008) following this 
approach argue that these types of formal political relations are vital for private enterprises. These 
can be achieved via representation on the National People’s Congress (NPC) or the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Alternatively, links with former 
government officials provide a further strong link to political elites. Such formal and semi-formal 
channels, it is argued, are more stable, long-term and authoritative and hence facilitate easier 
access to key resources owing to higher levels of political influence associated with them. Other 
more informal political relationships, it is argued, are typically rather short-term, unstable and 
ill-defined in nature thus difficult to usefully quantify (Li et al., 2008). Managers who have a 
publicly recognised political identity, moreover, may more easily participate in 
government-business interactions, as they have a higher degree of political embeddedness. 
Following Faccio’s (2010) formal approach, we identify whether a director of the board is a 
representative of National People’s Congress, a CPPCC member, a Chinese communist party 
member. Additionally, we include former government officials, following Li e al. (2008). Using 
these types of more formal political connections we construct a continuous variable (PC1), 
measured by the proportion of the directors with these types of political connections on the board 
of directors (Chen et al., 2011).    
Overconfidence. Managerial overconfidence is often measured indirectly. This has been 
done in a number of ways. For example, using CEO stock options (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), 
CEO relative compensation (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), frequency of mergers and 
acquisitions (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007) and media evaluations of the CEOs’ profiles (Brown 
and Sarma, 2007). One important constituent element of hubris (and how it is measured) relates 
to direct predictions of future firm performance. Within the literature measurements of over 
confidence often incorporate as much direct information as they can on managerial forecasting 
and predictions of the future.  For example, previous high profile research often uses 
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management forecast data regarding firms’ future earnings, looking at the difference between 
what the CEO has predicted and what it actually earns (i.e. the forecast error). Tang and Li (2015) 
and Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2006) are good examples. Our approach, in so far as it tries 
to directly gauge executives’ predictions, is similar in principle. We use the comparative 
investment patterns over time of our sample firms relative to peaks and troughs in the domestic 
Chinese business cycle (captured using GDP data) and relative to peer group investment 
behaviours. Business cycles are generally recognised to be difficult to predict and are associated 
with uncertainty. Our assumption is that a rational manager (i.e. non-cognitively biased) engages 
in an optimal enterprise investment pattern related to trends in the macroeconomic business cycle 
(given existing knowledge). We assume overconfident managers, however, overestimate their 
own capacities and/or the accuracy of the information they possess and thus typically follow 
different types of investment patterns. The proxy builds from the idea that overconfident 
managers are more prone to pre-empting changes in macroeconomic conditions.   The approach 
therefore involves estimating an optimal average industry specific investment behaviour 
corresponding to a non-cognitively biased profit maximising firm manager (given available 
information) relative to fluctuations in the business cycle. Against this benchmark we then 
measure the extent to which investment patterns deviate from it. In an ascending business cycle, 
overconfident managers are more inclined to predict and react to an approaching peak relative to 
their industry peers (see figure 1). They respond by undertaking reductions in investments in 
response to the approaching peak when compared with non-cognitively biased peers. By contrast, 
during a descending cycle, they are more willing and ready to predict the trough and increase 
investment earlier than non-cognitively biased managers. Conversely, managers with lower 
confidence levels are less willing to make such judgement calls. Their investment responses 
therefore lag behind their overconfident peers and move in a comparatively more synchronous 
manner with the business cycle.  Further specific details and a derivation of our proxy is 
outlined in the Appendix. 
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FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
 
Control variables. Guided by existing approaches, we included a number of control 
variables that influence the intensity of private sector R&D. We include company characteristics, 
including size, profitability, age and industry (Lee, 2009; Griffiths and Webster, 2010). Corporate 
governance variables, such as ownership concentration, equity checks and balances, and manager 
shareholdings are also included (Tribo et al., 2007; Dong and Gou, 2010). Table I outlines the 
relevant variables selected for this research.  
 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
 
3.3 Models 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple linear regression is used to model the influence of 
managerial political connections and cognitive biases on private sector R&D intensity. The 
regression model is as follows: 
       （1） 
where （ ）is the regression coefficient,  act as residuals, and PC stands for the 
political connection variables (we use PC1, the continuous measurement and also PC2, the 
dummy variable, as a robustness test). To avoid the potentially high correlation between the 
interaction terms related to the political connection variable we use the hierarchical block method 
when introducing the regulating variables (i.e. OCD). Normalized explanatory variables were 
used following this procedure: step 1, included all control variables; step 2, introduced the 
political association variable (PC1); step 3, introduced the managerial cognitive bias variables 
OCD; step 4 introduced their interaction. 
11
0 2 31 4& iiR OCD OCDD PC ControlPC         
i 0,...,11i  
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4 Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficient analysis 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the measurement of the degree of managerial overconfidence in the 1,293 
sample companies. Table II provides sample descriptive statistics. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE. 
 
The average R&D intensity in our sample enterprises was 2.1% (Table II). The R&D intensity of 
69% of the enterprises is below 5%, indicating private sector R&D intensity is generally low in 
China. The mean value of our recorded managerial overconfidence is 0.155 (maximum value 
0.564, minimum value -0.383). Across these measures, 67% are greater than zero. Of the 2,012 
chairmen and general managers in the sample enterprises, 28.1% of them have political 
associations, as do 15.2% of the 11,362 board members. Overall, 942 companies in the sample 
have political associations and the proportion is as high as 72.85%, suggesting the managers of 
China’s non state-owned listed companies frequently establish governmental political 
associations. In addition, there are 896 manufacturing enterprises constituting 69.3% of the 
sample and 397 non-manufacturing enterprises (30.7% of the sample firms). 
In order to measure the correlation between and among the dependent and independent 
variables and determine whether there is multicollinearity among the explanatory variables we 
report Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients (Table III). As well as ownership 
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concentration (SHARE), some of the explanatory variables are highly correlated with R&D 
intensity, indicating they may have explanatory power relating to our dependent variable (R&D 
intensity). Managerial political association (PC1), for example, is significantly negatively related 
to enterprise R&D intensity (preliminarily supporting Hypothesis 1b, namely that political 
association significantly inhibits R&D intensity). Managerial overconfidence (OCD) is 
significantly positively related to enterprise R&D intensity, suggesting managerial 
overconfidence may play a role in promoting R&D intensity (hypothesis 2) . Further, the data in 
Table III show that the correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables are less than 0.3, 
suggesting multicollinearity is not a serious concern (Lind, 2006). The Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) were also less than 5 (Table IV), confirming this view.  
 
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE. 
 
4.2 Regression analysis of managerial political connections, overconfidence, and R&D intensity 
Table IV reports the regression results of the impact of managerial political connections and 
overconfidence on R&D intensity. The Hausman test assesses whether the the random-effect 
coefficients are biased and thus whether a fixed-effect model should be used (as shown in Table 
IV). The Hausman null hypothesis was rejected and thus the fixed-effect model was adopted. 
Model 1 assesses the impact of the control variables on R&D intensity. Model 2 includes the 
impact of the political connection variables on R&D intensity.  Model 3 examines the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on R&D intensity. Model 4 examines the moderating effect of 
managerial overconfidence. These models were analyzed using Hayes SPSS macro (Hayes, 2013). 
Model 5 examines the marginal effects of political connection and managerial overconfidence on 
R&D intensity. 
 
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
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According to the results of model 2, the regression coefficient of the political connection 
variable PC1 is negative and significant at 5% level. One additional political connection thus 
leads to 0.122 unit decrease in R&D intensity, meaning managers with weaker political 
connections invest more in R&D projects, supporting Hypothesis 1b. According to the results of 
model 3, the regression coefficient of managerial overconfidence is significantly positive at the 5% 
level (coefficient of 0.062). Moreover, the Adj-R2 significantly improved relative to Model 2, 
suggesting that overconfidence influences enterprise R&D intensity. This supports Hypothesis 2.  
In model 4, the coefficient of the interaction of managers’ overconfidence and political 
connection (OCD×PC1) is significantly positive at the 5% level. The adjusted R2 again 
significantly improved, justifying addition of the interaction. This supports hypothesis 3, namely 
that managerial overconfidence positively moderates the relationship between political ties and 
R&D intensity. Further, comparisons between models 2 and 4 show that the regression coefficient 
on PC1 decreases from -0.122 to -0.078, implying that the impact of political connections is 
considerably reduced when the interaction term is included (its significance, moreover, changes 
from the 5% to 10% level). In model 5, the marginal effects of political connection and managers’ 
overconfidence on R&D intensity are -0.029 and 0.063, namely that one percent change in 
political connection tends to decrease the R&D intensity by 0.029% and one percent change in 
managers’ overconfidence tends to increase the R&D intensity by 0.063%. Political connections 
and managerial overconfidence therefore have decreasing and increasing marginal effects on 
R&D intensity, respectively. 
The impacts of the control variables on R&D intensity are consistent with findings in the 
literature (model 1). Looking at firm-level characteristics, company age (AGE) has a negative 
and significant relationship with R&D intensity, possibly because more recently established 
companies are found in more innovative sectors (i.e. internet companies). Company performance 
(ROA) and R&D intensity (R&D) are significantly positively correlated, indicating that the better 
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the company’s performance, the stronger the financial intensity and the greater the investment in 
R&D. As technical characteristics and market competition patterns vary across industries, the 
industry that an enterprise belongs to will also affect its R&D intensity (R&D). Compared with 
manufacturing companies, non-manufacturers are more inclined towards technological 
innovation activities according to our sample. This is mainly because most private listed 
companies in China are in technology intensive industries, such as the internet and information 
technology, where technological innovation is high. With regards corporate governance, CEO 
share-holdings (MSH) and R&D intensity (R&D) are positively correlated and significant, 
indicating equity incentives for private enterprise executives positively influence innovation. The 
coefficient of equity balance degree (RSH) is positive and significant, suggesting that equity 
balances can promote innovative investment by private enterprise. However, the influence of 
board size and ownership concentration on R&D intensity are not significant, perhaps due to fact 
that the governance level of boards of directors of China’s private listed companies is generally 
low and equity is often relatively scattered, which limits the power of board members to intervene 
in the management of investment behaviour. 
To describe the moderating effect of managerial overconfidence, we follow the method 
proposed by Aiken and West (1991) by adding and subtracting one standard deviation on the 
mean of the independent variable (PC1) (see Figure 4). Figure 4 shows the higher the degree of 
managerial overconfidence, the greater the positive slope of the line segment. This means that the 
more overconfident managers are, the stronger the positive influence of political connections on 
R&D Intensity tends to be. Furthermore, the positive moderation of a negative main effect has the 
potential for a switching effect. These results are consistent with those of the regression analysis. 
 
Figure 4 ABOUT HERE 
4.3 Robustness tests 
In order to test the robustness of the results, further regression analysis was carried out 
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using the dummy variable approach to empirically explore the impact of formal political 
connections. To recall, this approach has sometimes been used in other studies. A dummy 
variable approach to capture overconfidence (OCD) was also tested. Specifically, observations 
with values greater than the median OCD median were assigned 1, or 0 otherwise (Table VI). 
There were no substantive changes in sign or statistical significance of the coefficients on the 
key variables in both cases. 
 
4.4 Endogeneity tests 
Managerial cognitive bias and the R&D intensity may influence each other. On the one hand, 
managerial cognitive biases may influence R&D intensity; on the other hand, the greater the 
R&D intensity of private firm, the stronger the firm’s technical capacity, and the more likely the 
managers tend to be overconfident. And this endogeneity of sample selection may lead to biased 
research conclusions. Thus, we use the Heckman two-step method to correct for this selection 
bias. First, a selection model of managerial cognitive bias is built. Then we calculate the Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR) in order to control for the possible endogeneity of managerial cognitive bias. 
As to the selection model of managerial cognitive bias, we adopt the industry average of the 
degree of overconfidence of the executives of listed companies. These variables can be regarded 
as exogenous variables for they are not influenced by managers directly. Thus, the selection 
model is as follows: 
 
The result from the regression analysis is: 
 
 
The number in brackets is the matching Z statistics. Based on the selection model above, we 
calculate the IMR respectively, and then enter the IMR into measurement model to perform 
0 1OCD VOCD    
   
-0.019 0.96
4.328 3.766
OCD VOCD 

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further regression analysis. The results show that all the IMRs failed to pass the test of 
significance and the relationship between managerial overconfidence and R&D intensity is 
correspondingly consistent with table 4. This illustrates that, taking account of possible 
endogeneity and sample selection bias, the conclusions regarding the influence of managerial 
overconfidence and over-optimism on private firm’s R&D intensity remain robust. 
 
5 Discussion  
We firstly recap on why better understanding Chinese private sector R&D intensity is of potential 
importance. Secondly, we reconsider the reasons for what some may consider the 
counter-intuitive results regarding the negative impact of political ties on innovation intensity. 
Thirdly, we further reflect upon the considerable impact of cognitive orientation in Chinese senior 
management on R&D intensity, as well as the import of these findings for managers and 
policy-makers.  
 
5.1 Private sector innovation and the importance of R&D intensity 
 The role of private sector innovation in China is attracting increasing research attention 
(Lin et al. 2011: Deng, et al. 2013; Zhu et al. 2012). Innovation in the private sector, by driving 
greater productivity growth, may facilitate China’s drive to break through the so called “middle 
income trap” (World Bank, 2013). China’s innovation policy, it has been argued, should now 
evolve “to reflect the lesson borne from international experience that most applied research and 
innovation is done within large private sector firms” (World Bank, 2013: 36)(emphasis added). 
Both extensive (more private sector firms) and intensive development (deepening of innovation 
capabilities within firms) are mechanisms by which this end might be achieved. Increased R&D 
intensity, however, is arguably important if China’s private sector firms are to successfully 
compete internationally, particularly in technologically advanced sectors. As noted, Chinese 
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businesses have relied considerably upon imitation, adoption and importation of foreign 
technologies to date. Explorative innovation has been identified as somewhat lacking in Chinese 
businesses (Al Corta et al.2009; Gu et al. 2009; Lin, 2013; World Bank, 2013). As these 
businesses move closer to the international technology frontier, however, imitative innovation 
strategies of the “minimalist” or “embodied knowledge” types are, arguably, less likely to 
succeed. This is because “innovation at the technology frontier is quite different in nature from 
simply catching up technologically” and thus the role of private sector, some argue, becomes 
“critical” (World Bank, 2013: 17). Greater private sector R&D intensity could be one important 
step towards achieving higher levels of explorative innovation.  
 
5.2 The influence of political ties on R&D intensity 
To further explore what determines R&D intensity in the private sector we considered the 
impact of formal political ties, likely of importance in a transition economy like China with 
institutional voids (Gu and Lundvall, 2006). Interestingly, private sector R&D intensity in our 
sample was negatively impacted by formal political connections. This stands in contrast to some 
earlier studies that find positive links between political ties and innovation (Cummings and Wu, 
2015; Lin et al. 2011). It may also appear counter-intuitive in light of how China’s private sector 
has emerged. This has involved close links between private businesses and different levels of 
government. State linkages, at various levels (including the township and village level), for 
example, have historically provided access to financing for local firms (Gu et al. 2009; Naughton, 
2007). We therefore might expect political ties to be influential in securing additional financing 
for innovation. Our empirical findings on the impact of political ties therefore require further 
consideration. We outline beneath several possible reasons for our results. 
First, as our findings on the interaction between managerial overconfidence and political ties 
imply, in instances where the qualitative nature of innovation is largely exploitative, it is possible 
investment in political ties may be of limited commercial value. Owing to the incremental nature 
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of exploitative types of innovation, regulatory approvals and intellectual property rights 
protection (and general interaction with government bureaucracy) may be unnecessary. In the 
case of intellectual property rights protection, for example, it may well be difficult, if not 
impossible, to meaningfully protect innovations that are exploitative in nature. These innovations 
are easily copied and cannot be protected via either formal or informal channels. In the case of 
government approvals, moreover, these also may not be required for exploitative innovative 
activity. Thus, political ties only provide marginal benefits, if any at all. They may in fact, as our 
results suggest, be outweighed by the associated costs of having political ties (i.e. interference, 
monetary bribes associated with corruption and the like) (Zhang et al. 2015). Thus the link 
between political ties and innovation is attenuated in these circumstances. Developing political 
ties incurs costs but yields comparatively little by way of return. Political ties may, therefore, lead 
to marginally lower levels of innovation intensity.  
Secondly, it is widely thought that financial markets are imperfect when it comes to provision 
of venture capital for the purposes of innovation and that firms may typically face a “funding gap” 
(Hall, 2005). Thus, as noted, if political ties can facilitate access to capital they should in theory 
be beneficial. Yet our results imply that the potential benefits of political ties are more than offset 
by their other downsides. One explanation for these counterintuitive results could relate to the 
fact that our sample firms are all publicly listed.  They therefore have greater access to direct 
finance than unlisted firms. This may alleviate, to some extent, the financing constraints they face 
via other indirect financing channels (i.e. the banking sector).  
Thirdly, it is worth noting that when managerial overconfidence is incorporated and our 
model is fully specified (i.e. the interaction term is included), the size of the negative coefficient 
on political ties is reduced considerably (and its significance drops to the 10% level instead of 
5%). This suggests that even if political ties have an independent negative impact, it may be 
comparatively small and open to a higher degree of uncertainty (given the lower level of 
significance). This is somewhat in line with the arguments presented earlier suggesting 
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competing possibilities with regards to the impact of political ties on innovation (see hypothesis 
1a and 1b). Thus in some cases they may potentially beneficial, but in others not, although on 
balance the negative impacts appear to outweigh the positive in our sample of firms.  
 
5.3 The role of managerial overconfidence in transition economies and emerging markets 
Managerial overconfidence has positive impacts on firm innovation in developed markets 
(both in terms of volumes of inputs and outputs, as well as innovation efficiency) (Galasso and 
Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Compared to firms in developed markets, however, those 
in China’s private sector arguably face far greater uncertainty and risks when innovating. This is 
caused by an underdeveloped and capricious institutional environment as well as comparatively 
high levels of market volatility. Imperfect markets also constrain innovation. Under such 
circumstances, it should perhaps not be so surprising to find that managerial overconfidence 
influences R&D intensity in China’s weak institutional environment.  
Interestingly, two other studies have specifically explored the impact of managerial 
overconfidence in China (Li and Tang, 2010; Tang et al., 2015). Tang et al. (2015) use survey 
responses from 2,820 firms for the year 2000 and Li and Tang (2010) use similar data, looking at 
a variety of moderating influences. Tang et al. (2015) find a strong positive relationship between 
innovation and overconfidence, albeit they consider innovation outputs (new product sales as 
opposed to R&D intensity). Li and Tang (2010) also find a positive relationship between 
overconfidence and risk-taking. However, in both studies the observation period is now quite 
dated (i.e. their studies come from the year 2000). Furthermore, their samples consist of a large 
number of state-owned enterprises (Li and Tang, 2010; Tang et al., 2015. By contrast, we 
specifically consider privately controlled (i.e. non state-owned) businesses and do so for a more 
recent period (2010-14). We conjecture, based on our results, that it is possible that managerial 
overconfidence may work differently for private firms in influencing innovation in China (as 
might political ties, and the interaction between the two). Given the additional challenges private 
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sector firms may face when innovating compared to state-owned firms (lack of financing and 
intellectual property rights protection, for example), managerial overconfidence may be 
particularly important for private sector firms. In Li and Tang’s (2010) study, for example, they 
found that managerial overconfidence was actually insignificant as a determinant of risk-taking in 
state owned firms. In the private sector sample (using a sample of 2,790 firms), by contrast, it 
was highly significant. This suggests that hubris may work differently in China among firms of 
different ownership class, with its impact being felt more strongly in the private sector. It is also 
possible, of course, that managers in private firms may be less constrained and enjoy greater 
autonomy in decision making, allowing them to engage in greater risk-taking. Our results 
certainly reinforce the idea that the mind-set of managers is influential in driving more intensive 
innovation in China’s private sector.  
Why might a hubristic mind-set be important in fostering greater innovation in China in 
future? As already noted, imitative “minimalist” or “embodied knowledge” approaches to 
innovation have been common to date (Gu et al. 2009: 380). A considerable level of managerial 
confidence may be required to facilitate the movement from an exploitative minimalist mind-set 
to more explorative approaches. Our findings are suggestive of this, as they show that it is 
specifically overconfident managers that can redirect their firms towards higher levels of R&D 
intensity. Thus overconfidence appears important for innovation intensity in the context of a weak 
institutional environment with businesses that have historically been strongly wedded to 
exploitative innovation. The historical context of Chinese innovation, which has been 
considerably shaped by imitative learning, reinforces why managerial overconfidence may be an 
important factor in driving forward qualitatively different types of innovation in China’s private 
sector.  
In future, further research should examine what the outcomes of higher R&D intensity 
strategies have been. It should examine whether innovation efficiency is also higher in 
overconfident managers in China, as it has found to be in the US. As well as looking at the 
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impacts across ownership classes, future research could also try and systematically investigate the 
impacts of managerial overconfidence across different national contexts. For it may be that 
managerial overconfidence plays a more significant role within the context of markets that suffer 
from institutional voids and imperfect markets, like China’s transition economy.  
 
5.4 Managerial overconfidence and its interaction with political ties 
The finding that overconfidence positively moderates the impact of political ties on R&D 
intensity is striking. The moderation effect, moreover, switches the relationship from a negative 
to a positive one in private sector firms with overconfident executives. This means managerial 
character traits seem to play a central role in shaping innovation intensity in China’s private 
sector. Our preferred interpretation, as discussed, is that overconfidence drives qualitative 
changes in the nature of innovation taking place, which is akin to a switch mechanism (illustrated 
clearly in our results). Overconfidence breeds greater explorative activities (Hirshleifer et al. 
2012). This in turn benefits from the additional certainty associated with political ties in 
negotiating an uncertain institutional environment (Zhang et al. 2015). Political ties foster the 
assurances required for approval of more intense exploratory research. Additional political ties in 
the presence of overconfidence, therefore, may lead to greater R&D intensity. They drive greater 
R&D intensity as they allow the full rents to be appropriated from such investments (via 
regulatory or informal approval or protection of intellectual property rights).   
Additionally, overconfident managers may well be able to extract greater value from political 
ties, owing to their more assertive character dispositions and their ability to breed confidence in 
the projects they undertake. Managerial overconfidence, for example, has sometimes been 
measured by the frequency of positive, self-promoting news stories that have appeared in media 
outlets. Unlike non-cognitively biased managers, overconfident managers are therefore likely to 
be more active at being heard promoting themselves and their businesses. This could be 
important in winning political support and also help in maximising the returns from any given 
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political affiliation.   
Of course, there are alternative explanations for the positive interaction between 
overconfidence and political ties. Research on overconfidence, for example, has focused on 
exploring the boundary conditions of the relationship between overconfidence and innovation 
(Tang et al. 2015; Galasso and Simcoe, 2011). It has been found, for example, that environmental 
munificence, complexity and dynamism weaken the positive relationship between overconfidence 
and innovation (Li and Tang, 2015). Further, when a manager holds dual roles as CEO and board 
chairman, or when cash-flow is strong, there is an increased positive moderation in the 
relationship between overconfidence and innovation (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011).  Thus 
overconfidence itself is both positively and negatively moderated, depending upon context. It is 
also not inconceivable that political ties positively moderate overconfidence. Perhaps, for 
example, overconfident private sector managers feel particularly emboldened regarding their 
innovation prospects when in receipt of political support. Further research is required to explore 
these alternative possibilities.  
 
5.5 Managerial and policy implications 
Overconfidence strongly influences Chinese innovation intensity.  Chinese firms hoping to 
increase R&D spending may therefore have to think carefully about recruiting managers with 
these personality traits, or encourage incumbents to become bolder in their thinking and 
approaches to innovation. Political strategies, moreover, under certain conditions are also 
important for China’s large private sector firms looking to intensify their innovation efforts. In 
the presence of overconfident executives political ties appear to add value in the private sector. 
Developing a managerial ethos of overconfidence therefore appears particularly beneficial for the 
fostering of greater innovation intensity in China’s private sector. This is because it not only has 
an independent influence but it also works to further intensify the value of political ties. Future 
research may also consider whether and China’s educational system fosters (or retards), if at all, a 
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particular cognitive orientation.  
From a broader policy perspective more can still be done to improve the soft institutional 
environment in which the private sector attempts to innovate. Our findings point to the pervasive 
existence of complex relationships formed between the private sector and political actors. For 
firms that do not have overconfident top managers, these relationships in general act as a drag on 
innovation intensity. If the large-scale private sector is to thrive and engage in more intense 
innovation activities, better formal institutions are therefore still required. Even for firms with 
overconfident managers, there are still likely to be costs associated with the development of 
political ties (costs that we do not measure here). And while some firms may be better able to 
benefit and thus justify these costs, the first best solution will be to create a level playing and 
reduce the costs across the board associated with firm innovation. By doing so China’s private 
sector firms will be able to fully contribute towards increased innovation led productivity growth.  
 
5.6 Limitations and future research directions 
We measure the political connections of private corporations based on whether the senior 
executives are deputies in the NPC, members of the CPPC, party representatives or former public 
officials. This approach, however, covers only those cases in which formal contacts exist, 
arguably capturing only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to actual political connectedness. 
Future research could attempt to capture political connections in a more thorough manner, 
accounting for the complex web of informal relationships that also typify many political to 
business relationships in China. Second, our sample is made up of Chinese listed companies, and 
no comparative or cross-cultural approach was conducted. Previous research suggests that 
Chinese psychological features differ somewhat from those of other countries, especially some 
Western countries. For example, Chinese may have a higher degree of overconfidence than 
Americans (Lee et al., 1995). In future research, the influence of managerial cognitive bias on 
firm R&D intensity in different cultural and institutional contexts should be further explored, so 
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as to ascertain the relative impact and importance of this managerial trait across international 
settings.  
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Appendix 
Estimating a managerial overconfidence proxy 
Our approach involves firstly calculating the degree of rationality of the manager. This is given 
by the weighted average distance between the macroeconomic conditions at the time of 
investment and the turning-point of the macro-economic business cycle. Secondly, managerial 
overconfidence is estimated by estimating the difference between the degree of rationality of the 
manager and the industry average.  
Managerial overconfidence is initially measured relative to the macroeconomy ( ME ) . Key 
points in the macroeconomic business cycle should therefore firstly be defined (see figure 1).The 
point t ( )i startascent t
 represents the turning point corresponding the thi ascending half-cycle, which is 
equal to the turning-point of the 1thi  descending half-cycle ( 1t ( )i enddescent t
  ).  
Correspondingly, t ( )i startdescent t
 represents the start of the thi descending half-cycle, equivalent to 
the end of the thi ascending half-cycle ( t ( )i endascent t
 ). Furthermore, 
( )i startascentT t
ME  denotes the macroeconomic 
state at the starting point of the thi ascending half-cycle and 
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Fig.5. definitions of key points in the business cycle 
Managerial investment behavior within the macroeconomic business cycle can be divided into 
additions (increments) and reductions (decrements) in investment undertaken with a view to 
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maximizing profits over time. To evaluate the efficiency of managers’ investment behavior with 
respect to two decision-making goals of saving costs and increasing returns, several parameters 
are specified. The first relates to the efficiency of incremental investment’s saving ( EIIS ) and 
second to the efficiency of incremental investment’s income ( EIII ). These respectively represent: 
the enterprise’s cost saving efficiencies by carrying out the incremental investment below that of 
the previous peak in the business cycle; and growth efficiency of the return on investment by 
carrying out the incremental investment below the next peak in the business cycle. The second 
involves the efficiency of decremental investment’s saving ( EDIS ) and efficiency of decremental 
investment’s income ( EDII ), which represents: the enterprise’s cost saving efficiency by carrying 
out the decremental investment before the next trough in the business cycle; and growth 
efficiency of the return on investment by carrying out the decremental investment above the 
previous trough in the business cycle, respectively.  
 
These are expressed thus:  
    
1t ( )
t ( )
-1, t [t ( ), t ( )]
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 

 
 






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  (2);   
1
t ( )
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-1, t [t ( ), t ( )]
i end
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t i start i end
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
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t ( )
EDIS = -1,t [t ( ), t ( )]
i end
descent
i start i endt
t ascent descent
t
ME
t t
ME 
      (4);    
t ( )
EDII = -1, t [t ( ), t ( )]
i start
ascent
i start i endt
t ascent descent
t
ME
t t
ME 
      (5) 
    
Further, in order to comprehensively evaluate the efficiency of managers’ decremental investment 
and incremental investment behavior in saving costs and increasing returns, we construct the 
efficiency of incremental investment ( EII ) which is the mean value of EIIS  and EIII , and the 
efficiency of decremental investment ( EDI ) which is the mean value of EDIS  and EDII .The 
equations of EII  and EDI  are expressed thus: 
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2
2
t t
t
t t
t
EIIS EIII
EII
EDIS EDII
EDI



 

                                 (6) 
Subsituting formulas (2)~(5) into (6) we are given:  
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                (8) 
where ME is measured using GDP data, t ( )i startascent t
 and t ( )i endascent t
 represent the starting and end points of 
the thi  ascending half-cycle respectively, t ( )i startdescent t
  and t ( )i enddescent t
  represent the starting point and 
ending point of the thi  descending half-cycle respectively. 
 
The measurement of managerial overconfidence 
    Following this definition of the rational level of investment, we construct the degree of 
rationality of both decrements in investment ( RDDI ) and increments ( RDII ) in investment 
behaviour. RDDI is the relative distance of the decrements in investment efficiency to its 
minimum, while RDII  is the relative distance of the incremental investment efficiency to its 
minimum. The equations for RDDI  and RDII  are as follows: 
min
max min
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Substituting formulas (7) and (8) into (9) and (10) respectively:
 
For the ascending business cycle, we are given; 
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For the descending business cycle, we are given;  
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The degree of rationality ( RD ) is the weighted average of RDDI and RDII , expressed here as: 
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Where 
( )startascentT t
ME denotes the state at the start of the ascending half of the business cycle and
( )endascentT t
ME  at the end; correspondingly, 
descent
startT
ME and end
descentT
ME reflect those at the start of the downward 
half of the macroeconomic business cycle. Further, tII and tDI  indicate the firm’s increments and 
decrements in investment (at time t ). 
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half
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 as weights to calculate the weighted 
average distance to the macroeconomic business cycle ( tME ) (i.e when decrements in investment 
to that in the wave trough start
ascentT
ME or end
descentT
ME , for two adjacent half cycles, the end of the last 
descending half cycle is the valley which is the start of next ascending cycle). ascentT and descentT are 
the states at the beginning of the ascending and descending halves of the business cycles and 
tME denotes the macroeconomic state at time t . 
Here our degree of managerial rationality degree is weighted by t
t
t Thalf
II
II


 and
half
t
t
t T
DI
DI


 so as to 
calculate the weighted average of the difference in value. We employ the weighted average to 
indicate the degree of managerial overconfidence using the following for the ascending and 
descending business cycles: 
 38 
 
max( 0) max( 0)ascent ascent
ascent ascent ascent
ascent ascent
t t
t T t T
T T T
t t
t T t T
DI II
OCD RDDI RDDI RDII RDII
 
 
 
   
 
 
， ，    
max( 0) max( 0)descent descent
descent descent descent
descent descent
t t
t T t T
T T T
t t
t T t T
II DI
OCD RDII RDII RDDI RDDI
 
 
 
   
 
 
， ，     
 39 
 
References 
 
Alcorta, L., Tomlinson, M., Liang, A.T., 2009. Knowledge Generation and Innovation in Manufacturing Firms in 
China. Ind. Innov. 16, 435–461. doi:10.1080/13662710903064109 
Baron, R. M., and Kenny, D. A. (1986). “The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological 
research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations.”  Journal of personality and social psychology, Vol. 
51 No. 6, pp.1173. 
Brettel, M., Kasch, M., and Mueller, A. (2008). “CFO overconfidence, optimism and corporate financing.” In 2008 
FMA Annual Meeting. 
Brown, R., and Sarma, N. (2007). “CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions.” Journal of 
Economics and business, Vol. 59 No. 5, pp. 358-379. 
Barlevy G. (2007) “On the cyclicality of research and development.” American Economic Review, Vol. 97 No.4, pp. 
1131-1164. 
Cai D. and Wan D. F., (2012). “Do Institutional Environments Matter for Firm’s R&D Investment?” Science of 
Science and Management of S. and T., Vol. 33 No. 4, pp. 121-128. 
Chen, C. J., Li, Z., Su, X., and Sun, Z. (2011). “Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the 
control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence.” Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 229-243. 
Chen, W. R., and Miller, K. D. (2007). “Situational and institutional determinants of firms' R&D search intensity.” 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 369-381. 
Cumming, D., Rui, O.M.,. Political Instability, Access to Private Debt , and Innovation Investment in China. 
Emerging Market Review, forthcoming. 
De Bondt, W. F., and Thaler, R. H. (1994). “Financial decision-making in markets and firms: A behavioral 
perspective.” National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 4777. 
Deaves, R., Lüders, E., and Luo, G. Y. (2009). “An experimental test of the impact of overconfidence and gender on 
trading activity.” Review of finance, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 555-575.  
Deng, Z., Hofman, P.S., Newman, A., 2013. Ownership concentration and product innovation in Chinese private 
SMEs. Asia Pacific J. Manag. 30, 717–734. doi:10.1007/s10490-012-9301-0 
Detomasi, D. A. (2008). “The political roots of corporate social responsibility.” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 82 
No. 4, pp.807-819. 
Dong, J., and Gou, Y. N. (2010). “Corporate governance structure, managerial discretion, and the R&D investment in 
China.” International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 180-188. 
Doukas, J. A., and Petmezas, D. (2007). “Acquisitions, overconfident managers and self‐attribution Bias.” European 
Financial Management, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 531-577. 
Dugal, S. S., and Morbey, G. K. (1995). “Revisiting corporate R&D spending during a recession.” 
Research-Technology Management, Vol.38 No. 4, pp. 23-27. 
Elitzur, R. (2011). “The accounting art of war: Bounded rationality, earnings management and insider trading.” 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 30 No. 3, pp. 203-216. 
Faccio, M. (2010). “Differences between politically connected and non-connected firms: a cross country analysis”, 
Financial Management, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 905-928. 
Forbes, D. P. (2005). “Are some entrepreneurs more overconfident than others?.” Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 
20 No. 5, pp. 623-640. 
Friedman, H. (2007). “Does overconfidence affect entrepreneurial investment?.” Wharton Research Scholars Journal, 
pp.42. 
Galasso, A., and Simcoe, T. S. (2011). “CEO overconfidence and innovation.” Management Science, Vol. 57 No. 8, 
pp. 1469-1484. 
Gentry, R. J., and Shen, W. (2013). “The impacts of performance relative to analyst forecasts and analyst coverage on 
firm R&D intensity.” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 34 No. 1, pp. 121-130. 
Gervais, S., Heaton, J. B., and Odean, T. (2007). “Overconfidence, investment policy, and manager welfare.” 
Working Paper, Fuqua School of Business.  
Goldstein, S. M. (1995). “China in transition: The political foundations of incremental reform.” The China Quarterly, 
Vol. 144, pp. 1105-1131. 
Griffiths, W., and Webster, E. (2010). “What governs firm-level R&D: Internal or external factors?.” Technovation, 
Vol. 30 No. 7, pp. 471-481. 
Gu, S., Lundvall, B., 2006. China ’ s innovation system and the move towards harmonious growth and endogenous. 
Innov. Manag. policy Pract. 8, 1–26. 
Gu, S., Lundvall, B.-Å., Liu, J., Malerba, F., Schwaag Serger, S., Serger, S.S., 2009. China’s System and Vision of 
Innovation: An Analysis in Relation to the Strategic Adjustment and the Medium- to Long-Term S&T Development 
Plan (2006-20) Introduction. Ind. Innov. 16, 369–388. doi:10.1080/13662710903053631 
Hackbarth, D. (2008). “Managerial traits and capital structure decisions.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 843-881. 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based 
 40 
 
approach. Guilford Press. 
Hall, B.H., 2005. The Financing of Innovation: Rand J. Econ. 36, 719–752. doi:10.1111/j.1467-999X.1965.tb00328. 
Hayward, M. L., and Hambrick, D. C. (1997). “Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of 
CEO hubris.” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 42 No. 1, pp.103-127. 
Heaton, J. B. (2002). “Managerial optimism and corporate finance.” Financial management, pp.33-45. 
Herz, H., Schunk, D., and Zehnder, C. (2014). “How do judgmental overconfidence and over-optimism shape 
innovative activity?.” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 83, pp. 1-23. 
Hirshleifer, D., Low, A., and Teoh, S. H. (2012). “Are overconfident CEOs better innovators?.” The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 67 No. 4, pp. 1457-1498. 
Jean-Sebastien M. (2010). “Does managerial optimism lead to long-run underperformance? Evidence from venture 
capital-backed IPOs HEC Montreal. ” Working paper. 
Jiang Y. W., Huang Y. and Xu W., (2012). “The Political Connections and R&D of Private Enterprises Based on the 
Perspective of Marketization Degree.” Science Research Management, No. 10, pp. 48-55. 
Knight, F. H. (2012). Risk, uncertainty and profit. Courier Dover Publications. 
Koka, B. R., and Prescott, J. E. (2002). “Strategic alliances as social capital: A multidimensional view.” Strategic 
management journal, Vol. 23 No. 9, pp. 795-816. 
Lee, C. Y. (2009). “Competition favors the prepared firm: Firms’ R&D responses to competitive market pressure.” 
Research Policy, Vol. 38 No. 5, pp. 861-870. 
Lee, C.-Y., Wu, H.-L., Pao, H.-W., 2014. “How does R&D intensity influence firm explorativeness? Evidence of 
R&D active firms in four advanced countries.” Technovation 34, 582-593. 
Lee, J. W., Yates, F. J., Sninotsuka, H., Singh, R., Onglatcc, M. L. U., Yen, N., and Bhatnagar, D. (1995). “Cross 
national difference in overconfidence.” Asian Journal of Psychology，Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 63-69. 
Lind, D. A., Marchal, W. G., and Wathen, S. A. (2006). Basic statistics for business and economics. Boston: 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., and Zhou, L. A. (2008). “Political connections, financing and firm performance: 
Evidence from Chinese private firms.” Journal of development economics, Vol. 87 No. 2, pp. 283-299. 
Li, H., Yang, Z., Yao, X., Zhang, H., and Zhang, J. (2012). “Entrepreneurship, private economy and growth: 
Evidence from China.” China Economic Review, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 948-961. 
Li, J., and Tang, Y. I. (2010). “CEO hubris and firm risk taking in China: The moderating role of managerial 
discretion.” Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 45-68. 
Lin, C., Lin, P., Song, F.M., Li, C., 2011. Managerial incentives, CEO characteristics and corporate innovation in 
China’s private sector. J. Comp. Econ. 39, 176–190. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2009.12.001 
Lin, H., Zeng, S. X., Ma, H. Y., Qi, G. Y., and Tam, V. W. (2014). “Can political capital drive corporate green 
innovation? Lessons from China.” Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 64, pp. 63-72. 
Lin, Y. H., Hu, S. Y., and Chen, M. S. (2005). “Managerial optimism and corporate investment: Some empirical 
evidence from Taiwan.” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 523-546. 
Lu, J., Liu, X., Filatotchev, I., and Wright, M. (2014). “The impact of domestic diversification and top management 
teams on the international diversification of Chinese firms.” International Business Review, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 455–
467 
Malmendier, U., and Tate, G. (2008). “Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction.” 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89 No.1, pp. 20-43. 
Naughton, B., 2007. Transitions and Growth. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, MA. 9263-7 
Nunes, P. M., Serrasqueiro, Z., and Leitão, J. (2012). “Is there a linear relationship between R&D intensity and 
growth? Empirical evidence of non-high-tech vs. high-tech SMEs.” Research Policy, Vol. 41 No.1, pp. 36-53. 
Oliver, (1991) 
Oskamp, S. (1965). “Overconfidence in case-study judgments.” Journal of consulting psychology, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 
261. 
Saha, S. (2014). “Firm's objective function and product and process R&D.” Economic Modelling, Vol. 36, pp. 
484-494. 
Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S., and Bridges, M. W. (1994). “Distinguishing optimism from neuroticism (and trait 
anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): a reevaluation of the Life Orientation Test.” Journal of personality and social 
psychology, Vol. 67 No. 6, pp. 1063. 
Sheng, S., Zhou, K. Z., and Li, J. J. (2011). “The effects of business and political ties on firm performance: Evidence 
from China.” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 75 No. 1, pp. 1-15. 
Shi Y.P. and Gu Q.L., (2013). “Intellectual Property Protection, Heterogeneous Firms and Innovation: Evidence from 
China’s Manufacturing Enterprises”, Journal of Financial Research, No. 8, pp. 136-149. 
Simon, H. A. (1986). “Rationality in psychology and economics.” Journal of Business, S209-S224. 
Song, M., Ai, H., Li, X., 2015. "Political connections, financing constraints, and the optimization of innovation 
efficiency among China's private enterprises". Technological Forecasting and Social Change,92, 290-299. 
Tang, Y., Li, J., Yang, H., 2015. What I See, What I Do How Executive Hubris Affects Firm Innovation. Journal of 
Management 41, 1698-1723. 
 41 
 
Tribo, J. A., Berrone, P., and Surroca, J. (2007). “Do the type and number of blockholders influence R&D 
investments? New evidence from Spain.” Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 15 No. 5, pp. 
828-842. 
UK DTI, (2012), BIS, Business, Innovation and Skill. (Accessed 11th May 2016)  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208170217/http://www.innovation.gov.uk/rd_scoreboard/default.asp 
Wang S.H., Wang Z.j. and Tian Y. (2013). “The relationship between managerial overconfidence and technological 
innovation investment”. Science Research Management, No. 5, pp. 1-9. 
Wang, Y. (2011). “A study on earnings management constraint model based on managerial overconfidence and 
over-optimism.” PhD dissertation, Da Lian University of Technology. 
Wu, J. (2011). “Asymmetric roles of business ties and political ties in product innovation.” Journal of Business 
Research, Vol. 64 No. 11, pp. 1151-1156. 
World Bank (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. New York: The Work Bank 
Express 
Yu, M. G.，Xia, X. P., and Zou, Z. S. (2006). “The relationship between managers overconfidence and enterprises，
radical behavior in incurring debts.” Management World, No. 8, pp. 104-112. 
Zhang, J., Tan, J., Wong, P.K., (2015). “When does investment in political ties improve firm performance? The 
contingent effect of innovation activities”. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 32, 363-387. 
Zhu, Y., Wittmann, X., Peng, M.W., 2012. Institution-based barriers to innovation in SMEs in China. Asia Pacific J. 
Manag. 29, 1131–1142. doi:10.1007/s10490-011- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 42 
 
 
 
Figures  
Political Connection
Overconfidence
R&D intensity
H1
H2
H3
 
Figure 1: conceptual model of political connections, overconfidence and firm R&D intensity 
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Fig. 2. The investment behavior of overconfident managers relative to the business cycle.  
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Figure 3 Measurement results for the degree of managerial overconfidence 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 The moderating effect of managerial overconfidence on the relationship between political connection 
and R&D Intensity 
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Tables  
 
 
Table I.  
Summary of variables.  
type name sign definition references 
Dependent  
variables 
R&D Intensity R&D The company’s annual R&D expenditure proportion 
of total annual sales revenues 
Chen & Miller, 2007; 
Gentry & Shen, 2013 
Independent 
variables 
political 
connection 
PC1 The proportion of board numbers with political 
connections 
Li et al., 2008，Chen, 2011 
PC2 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman of 
the board or general manager is a representative of 
the National People’s Congress, a CPPCC member, 
a Chinese communist party member, or a former 
government official or a former military 
membership, and 0 otherwise.(robustness test)  
Chen et al., 2011 
overconfidence OCD Managers’ overestimation of their management 
ability or of the accuracy of the information they 
possess.  
Wang, 2011 
Control 
variables 
company scale ASSET Natural logarithm of total assets of the company Griffiths&Webster,2010; 
Lee, 2009 
corporate age AGE The duration of Company’s registration date to the 
year-end date of observation 
industry type INDUS Manufacture=1；service=0 
profitability ROA The company’s total return on assets last year 
ownership 
concentration 
SHARE Sum of squares of the top five shareholders’ 
company shares 
Tribo et al., 2007; Dong & 
Gou, 2010 
the proportion of 
executives 
shareholding 
MSH The proportion of executives with equity shares 
board size SIZE The total number of the company’s directors at the 
end of the year 
ownership 
balance 
RSH The sum of shareholding of second to fifth big 
shareholder of the company 
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Table II. 
Summary of statistics. 
Variables R&D PC1 OCD ASSET ROA SHARE RSH MSH AGE SIZE INDUS 
Mean 0.021 0.155 0.171 23.558 0.079 0.195 0.236 0.129 16.553 5.961 0.693 
Median 0.013 0.128 0.151 22.336 0.071 0.168 0.207 0.033 16 7 1 
Maximum 0.281 0.500 0.564 26.101 0.425 0.692 0.551 0.856 61 10 1 
Minimum 0 0 -0.383 17.399 -0.238 0.003 0.004 0 10 2 0 
Std. Dev. 0.059 0.161 0.182 6.527 0.114 0.188 0.170 0.294 8.87 1.706 0.659 
 
Table III. 
Pearson correlation coefficients and Spearman correlation coefficients. 
Variables R&D PC1 OCD RSH ROA SIZE AGE INDUS SHARE ASSET MSH 
R&D  -0.153** 0.087* 0.216*** 0.187*** 0.038** -0.291*** -0.355*** 0.021 -0.238*** 0.033*** 
PC1 -0.175**  -0.034 -0.066 -0.029 -0.033 0.073* -0.005 0.061 0.235*** -0.056 
OCD 0.068** -0.021  0.040 -0.122 0.030 0.036 0.033 0.043 -0.017 -0.022 
RSH 0.271*** -0.050 0.037  0.192*** 0.037 -0.270** -0.071 -0.042 -0.236** 0.266** 
ROA 0.159* -0.042 -0.130 0.159***  -0.068 -0.126** -0.085 0.188*** -0.039 0.171** 
SIZE 0.041* 0.041 0.049 0.018 -0.091  0.117* 0.051 -0.129* 0.262*** -0.089 
AGE -0.223*** 0.113** 0.038 -0.240** -0.109 0.091  0.218*** -0.028 0.279*** -0.283*** 
INDUS -0.320*** 0.021 0.059 -0.101 -0.118* 0.028 0.173**  0.086 0.127 -0.164** 
SHARE 0.033 0.056 0.055 -0.127*** 0.137** -0.105 -0.013 0.110*  -0.021 -0.030 
ASSET -0.194*** 0.199*** -0.008 -0.259*** -0.034 0.213*** 0.225** 0.136 0.011  -0.271*** 
MSH 0.039 -0.042 0.013 0.233*** 0.160** -0.101* -0.230** -0.119* 0.028 -0.230***  
Notes: The lower left corner is the Pearson correlation coefficient, the top right corner is the Spearman correlation coefficient; *, * *, * * * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
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Table IV. Regression results of R&D intensity on managerial political connections and overconfidence. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
(Marginal.effect ) 
Constant  0.418 0.403 0.560 0.603 1.103 
3.362*** 3.655*** 3.922*** 2.598** 2.252** 
PC1  -0.122 -0.099 -0.078 -0.029 
 -2.631** -1.807** -1.855* -2.135** 
OCD   0.062 0.054 0.063 
  2.520** 2.709** 2.278** 
OCD×PC1    0.134 0.119 
   2.505** 2.418** 
ROA 0.077 0.051 0.060 0.043 0.031 
1.806* 1.964* 1.877** 2.502** 2.660** 
SHARE 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.005 
0.756 0.122 0.690 0.429 0.734 
RSH 0.113 0.135 0.143 0.220 0.395 
2.269** 2.774** 2.388** 2.490** 1.813* 
MSH 0.038 0.050 0.051 0.075 0.056 
2.433** 2.330** 2.431** 2.470** 2.609 
AGE -0.019 -0.004 -0.012 -0.011 -0.023 
-1.832* -1.763* -1.720* -1.903* -1.857* 
SIZE -0.008 -0.009 -0.01  -0.013 -0.016 
-1.291 -1.139 -1.122 -1.008 -0.974 
INDUS -0.487 -0.568 -0.637 -0.526 -0.447 
-5.536*** -5.252*** -4.346*** -4.623*** -3.341*** 
ASSET -0.055 -0.055 -0.029 -0.036 -0.019 
-2.398** -2.761** -2.365** -2.427** -2.158** 
F  
(P-value ) 
10.378*** 
(0.000) 
21.627*** 
(0.000) 
39.451*** 
(0.000) 
13.615*** 
(0.000) 
9.097*** 
(0.000) 
Adj-R2 0.212 0.226 0.274 0.295 0.306 
ΔAdj-R2 
(P-value) 
 0.014** 
(0.023) 
0.048*** 
(0.001) 
0.021** 
(0.018) 
 
VIF 1.097 1.219 3.204 4.099 3.872 
Hausman 
test(P-value) 
9.282** 
(0.029) 
11.326** 
(0.011) 
23.490*** 
(0.000) 
20.327*** 
(0.000) 
22.018*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 
Notes: Statistically significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 percent levels; the t-statistics are below the estimates. 
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